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• Air NZ/Qantas case raised an interesting
question
• Competition policy (Antitrust) is based on
one big economic idea
• “Monopolist” raises price by restricting
output
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• Results in two things:
– Transfer of money from consumers to
suppliers
– Deadweight Loss due to restriction of output
that would be worth more than it costs to
supply
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The great battle in Antitrust for past twenty
years has been about:
• Relative weight to be given to transfers
and deadweight loss
• Traditional Antitrust: transfers to
producers from consumers are bad
• Efficiency-based Antitrust: transfers net
out; just deadweight losses matter
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• New Zealand authorities (NZCC, High
Court) have gone further than anywhere
else in adopting pure efficiency-based
anti-trust
• Against the (purpose of) the Law?
• Never mind...
• Ask now: is it necessarily true that
monopolists ‘restrict’ output?
• They surely don’t want to!
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• The point is that T.O.L. pricing wastes
value
• Keener customers get the product for less
than their willingness to pay
• And less keen customers don’t get to
consume the product at all even though
they are willing to pay more than it
costs to supply!
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• Do some lateral thinking
• Query the key assumption
• The assumption of T.O.L. pricing
• What if firms can charge more than one
price?!?
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• Obvious challenge for firm’s pricing
managers
• Capture that surplus
• Well, suppose they succeeded
• Specifically, suppose a monopoly
supplier succeeded in perfect price
discrimination
• Means charging every customer their
willingness to pay
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• Economists call this price discrimination
• Airlines call it yield management
• Definition: “Price discrimination is charging
different prices to different customers for the
same or similar product (where, if the
products are not identical, the costs of
supplying them differ by less than the
differences in price).
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Implication:
• Consumers may pay a lot, on average
• But no deadweight loss!
Case dismissed?
(in New Zealand, anyway)
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• I decided to investigate further
• Already knew how pervasive is price
discrimination
• In many (most?) markets, there are at
least two prices:
- the posted or  sticker or rack-rate price
- a lower price you get, literally, by just asking for it!
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Passenger Air Travel Market
• Massive PD for more than twenty years
• Brilliant invention: Saturday Night Stay
over Requirement
• Purpose: to separate high-value
(business) travellers from low-value
discretionary (leisure) travellers.
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• Great idea, but
• Like all restrictions
• SNS restriction destroys some of the
value in the market
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Air New Zealand’s World-leading
Innovation
• Introduced their ‘Express Fare’ system
(December ’02)
 One-way fares
 Some restrictions
 Menu of prices offered simultaneously
 Adjust availability over time
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• Express does make the cheaper fares
more attractive to the high-value
customers (cannibalises the business
market)
• But it also makes them (much) more
attractive to everyone else
• Slogan: Being There!
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Basically, Express is a bold attempt to
grow the market by reducing average
fares
“Simplicity is the essence of affordable travel.
Fare structures were extensively simplified and
prices reduced by an average of 20% and up to
50%.  The everyday low fares stimulated traffice
by 22%...capacity increased by 10%” (Air New
Zealand Annual Report, 2003)
• Air NZ’s rival Qantas quickly copied the system
• And so, now, has Delta in the U.S.
• And Air Canada
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These ‘new’ fare systems work in two
dimensions
• They have a ‘horizontal’ offering of different prices
for the same flight.  You can buy whichever one you
like
• The idea is to add ‘features’ to the more expensive
tickets that cost less to provide than they are worth
to the people who buy them
o eg, offer FFP and status points to people who aren’t
paying for their tickets anyway
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And they have a ‘dynamic’ dimension:
• number of seats available at lowest fares is limited
• When the fare ‘bucket’ is filled, a new bucket is
offered of seats at a higher price
This system of ‘yield management’ attempts to fill
each flight with the highest-value customers
paying the maximum possible price
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(NZCC graphic)
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I I set out to study this:
• found that there is no standard theory or
model of price discrimination in oligopoly
– So I developed the theory
• found there was no empirical analysis of NZ
domestic and Trans-Tasman airfare pricing
– So I collected data and analysed this, with
research support funding from NZISCR
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Results: Theory
For imperfect (3rd Degree Price
Discrimination) with a finite and not large
number of price steps (or “fare buckets”):
• Increasing PD (ie more price steps)
– increases the high/low dispersion of
prices
– but makes no difference to the average
price paid [!]
(to a first-order linear approximation)
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• These results hold too for oligopoly
• That is, under (linear) Cournot-Nash
assumption, the average price charged by
an oligopoly with n firms is not changed
by the number of price steps!
• And, price dispersion decreases as
number of firms increases
• So much for theory…..is it true in fact?
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Results: Empirics
• Data: took the lowest offered price on Air NZ
and Qantas websites
• For about 100 flight numbers on 9 routes
– eight domestic NZ (4 with Qantas)
– Auckland-Sydney
• Wednesday flights from Nov 17, 2004 through
Jan 05, 2005
• Each flight observed about 12 times, beginning
nine weeks before actual flight date
• So ended up with 743 data points
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Estimated two models using EViews 4
Dependent variables:
• Average (lowest) fare
• Ratio of highest to lowest low fare
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examples of data…
110908508/12/044451530AKL-WTN
99908501/12/044451530AKL-WTN
99908524/11/044451530AKL-WTN
99908517/11/044451530AKL-WTN
36028019508/12/04411800AKL-WTN
28023022501/12/04411800AKL-WTN
36028019524/11/04411800AKL-WTN
28023019517/11/04411800AKL-WTN
P0P2P8DateFlightDepart. TimeRoute
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• LNPWAVK:   LOG [ WEIGHTED AVERAGE LOWEST FARE   PER
KILOMETRE ]
• PDIFF: RATIO LARGEST/SMALLEST LOWEST FARE
• LNDIST:    LOG [ NON-STOP ROUTE DISTANCE ]
• AKLSYD:   DUMMY = 1, IF ROUTE IS AUCKLAND-SYDNEY
• HH:   HERFINDAHL/HIRSCHMAN INDEX BASED ON NUMBER
OF DAILY FLIGHTS BY AIR NZ AND QANTAS ON A ROUTE
• SOLDDUM:  DUMMY  = 1, IF FLIGHT SOLD OUT BY FLIGHT
DATE
• PEAKDUM:  DUMMY = 1, IF FLIGHT APPEARS TO BE A ‘PEAK-
TIME’ BUSINESS FLIGHT
• QFDUM: DUMMY = 1 IF A QANTAS FLIGHT
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0.4642    S.D. dependent var0.63726Adjusted R-
squared
3.3044    Mean dependent
var
0.64019R-squared
0.01962.3391590.0503890.11786AKLSYD
0.0000-
7.235599
0.0272670.19729QFDUM
0.00009.2480920.0317590.29370SOLDDUM
0.000010.294400.0330700.34043PEAKDUM
0.00007.7115270.0637450.49157HH
0.0000-
19.79389
0.022625-
0.44784
LNDIST
0.000038.515920.1500225.77822C
Prob.t-StatisticStd. ErrorCoeffic i
ent
Variable
Included observations: 743
Sample: 1 743
Date: 05/22/05   Time: 19:26
Method: Least Squares
Dependent Variable: LNPWAVK
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0.7035    S.D. dependent var0.06873Adjusted R-squared
1.7087    Mean dependent var0.07501R-squared
0.00552.783250.094230.2622AKLSYD
0.00004.14775
9
0.06615
2
0.2743
8
QFDUM
0.16261.39770
6
0.07711
1
0.1077
7
SOLDDUM
0.00023.72467
7
0.08030
0
0.2990
9
PEAKDUM
0.00083.35261
3
0.15474
6
0.5188
0
HH
0.000010.9348
2
0.12166
5
1.3303
8
C
Prob.t-StatisticStd.
Error
Coeffici
ent
Variable
Included observations: 743
Sample: 1 743
Date: 05/22/05   Time: 20:05
Method: Least Squares
Dependent Variable: PDIFF
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Summary of Empirical Findings:
• Presence of competitor(s) reduces fares
• Air New Zealand earns a fare (fair?)
premium over Qantas
• More price discrimination on monopoly
routes
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Implications for Competition Policy
• If, before, you were mainly worried about the
distributional implication of market
dominance
– You should still be just as worried
• But, if your concern was with the allocative
efficiency implications of dominance
– You can be less worried
